Other major labels have done small experiments with the MP3 formats and now EMI's Blue Note joins the small fraternity by selling a new Norah Jones single in the MP3 format. Immediately, a chorus of journalists proclaimed, "It's about time." After reading yesterday's articles and blog posts, you would get the impression that the MP3 format will usher in unparalled growth in digital music sales. Hold on. Sales growth will require more than a format change. Consumer's motivations involve price and convenience, too.
Why sell MP3s? The popular explanation is that consumers dislike DRM and are better off without DRM. The two real reasons are iTunes' dominance and digital sales' lack of growth in the middle of 2006. Blue Note's consideration of the MP3 format has nothing to do with the benefit of consumers and everything to do with making money. Consumers may end up benefitting from the MP3's greater freedom, but this is not an excercise in corporate social responsibility. EMI wants to increase sales of digital music. One possible way of doing this is to allow the sale of MP3s, which the majors have not done only with isolated experiments.
The main sales driver in the case is the degree to which people value the MP3 enough to shop around. Apple will be the first to brag about its digital sales record, but has success come simply in spite of DRM? Coolfer believes the average consumer does not mind DRM -- and doesn't even know exactly what it is. Today at Digital Music News, Paul Resnikof expressed the same opinion.
"Protection schemes have been blamed for dampening overall download purchases, though pricing lurks as a potentially bigger culprit. Remember that Apple sells an overwhelming percentage of paid downloads, all wrapped with its FairPlay protection system. Yes, FairPlay is a DRM system like any other, but do users really care? Probably not, especially since tracks rarely trip a usability wire within the iTunes+iPod circle."
There is, however, a (possibly small) market to be tapped. Call it the disgruntled techie segment. These consumers are knowledgeable about file formats and stubborn enough change their purchasing habits. Offer them MP3s and the segment will return to buying major label music.
Since labels do not have variable pricing, and therefore cannot price discriminate (although subscription services fill that void a bit), an option is to segment the market by desired file format. Selling MP3s fits in that strategy. Imagine a website that licenses music to sell only the Ogg Vorbis format. It would contrast nicely and probably overlap very little with consumers who won't leave iTunes regardless of the DRM.
We can look at this from a plain old distrubution standpoint. If iTunes only works with the iPod, and labels want alternate routes to the iPod, and labels are unhappy with iTunes' Rockafellerian market share, then they need to try selling MP3s at other online stores. The best way to diminish the power of one retailer is to prop up other retailers.
Just how much can MP3 offerings at a store not named iTunes succeed? Let's look at the two biggest MP3 experiments to date. Jessica Simpson's "A Public Affair" single and Jesse McCartney's Right Where You Want Me don't appear to have changed the status quo. I don't know what Yahoo has sold, but McCartney's album has sold an overall 4% at digital stores (nothing out of the ordinary). There were over 530 different, customized versions of the Jessica Simpson single, and Yahoo! sold a total of 7,636 tracks, according to Soundscan. In contrast, the regular "A Public Affair" single has sold over 414,000 units. Almost all most certainly came from iTunes. If iTunes is responsible for 80% of "A Public Affair" sales, then sales of the Yahoo! MP3 version are only 2.3% of iTunes' sales of the regular single.
If consumers really want MP3s -- and the jury is out on the lengths they will go to get them -- more experiments will be needed to know for sure. Not one very six weeks, but large-scale experiments that will lead to entire catalogs being sold in the MP3 format.