This Fortune article is dated November 30 but I didn't see if for a few days. Writer Paul Sloan has a good look at concert promoter Live Nation and how it is striving to make the term "concert promoter" an outdated description of its business. I wasn't surprised that Live Nation head Michael Rapino dismissed labels' attempts at 360 deals, and I wasn't surprised he (probably) overestimated his company's ability to assume the duties of a record label.

Here's a sample:

"Live Nation execs won't reveal specifics, but people familiar with it say it's valued at around $120 million over a decade. They paid her $90 million upfront in stock and cash, these people say.

Could Live Nation make money on the expensive pact? Well, the contract would pay for itself if Madonna does four tours and three albums in the next decade with revenues comparable to her recent output, the key assumption being that the 49-year-old star suffers no major dropoff. Profits would then come from merchandise, sponsorships, DVDs, and on and on.

Warner fought to keep its star but ultimately conceded defeat. Publicly, it wished her well, noting that it was proud to retain her catalog of past albums and song rights, and that Madonna owes her next album to Warner. Privately, execs say the price just got too high. Says one industry insider: 'This is nothing but a loss leader.'" ...

Rapino dismisses 360 deals, which he argues simply take more from musicians. He brushes off the view that Live Nation needs record labels. He says he knows how to market and can pursue endless distribution options, whether it's cutting an exclusive deal with a retailer, as Paul McCartney did with Starbucks (Charts, Fortune 500), or slicing up albums into digital pieces and selling in a whole new format.

Ultimately, Rapino says, he's not looking to transform Live Nation into a label that bets on scores of artists in the hopes that one or two will score big. He plans to cherry-pick perhaps a dozen superstars over the next few years. That suggests he's less a revolutionary aiming to topple the labels than someone who hopes to use his superior cost structure and promotional acumen to make gobs of money.

Whatever the ultimate goal, investors are dubious. Live Nation's stock has sagged 30% since news of the Madonna deal. Rapino was concerned enough about the reaction that he and his lieutenants spent much of their first-ever presentation to analysts and investors in November defending the plan."

Sloan points out that Live Nation's cash flow margin is "anemic" (it really is thin). And there's one of the attractions of recorded music. Though it doesn't offer Google-esque margins, it beats concert promotion margins.

Here's something that's missing: Rapino's plan to "cherry-pick" (Sloan's words) only the top artists implies not the destruction of the label-artist model but a demarcation point at the highest levels of revenue. Not all artists are worthy of a Live Nation contract like Madonna recently signed. There exists a long process of artist development and a very low probability an artist will ever get to the point at which Live Nation would take interest. Sloan wrote that the model implies Rapino is "less a revolutionary" than a guy using his market presence to make a lot of money. If you consider artist development as the only visionary aspect of the process, then that's true. Personally I think Live Nation's approach is indeed visionary -- even if they're going to skim only the best of the best off label rosters.